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Religious Contestation between Christian and Muslim Community in the 'Gospel City' of Manokwari Papua

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Abstract

This article discusses the dynamics of the relationship between Papuan Muslims and Christians as the majority population. Part of the dynamic is the disharmony between the two religious adherents due to several reasons; construction of facilities for worship, namely mosques that are increasingly massive, fighting over each other for public space, domination of the bureaucracy by Christian elites, the economic sector, and strengthening of identity through the performance of religious symbols. Until its peak, the Local Regulation for the spiritual development of Manokwari emerged as the Gospel city. Qualitatively, this article describes and identifies ethnographically how the contestation between Muslims and Christians, the clash between the two, and the debate on the issue of local regulations of the Gospel. Some of the conclusions of this article find that the majority group feels that Papua has historically been the center of Christianity and the efforts to care for it are so strong, this is in line with the impact of what is happening outside Papua such as the many sharia regulations that are widely applied in Java and Sumatra areas.

Artikel ini membahas bagaimana dinamika hubungan antara Muslim Papua dan umat Kristiani sebagai penduduk mayoritas. Bagian dari dinamika itu adalah adanya disharmoni antar kedua pemeluk agama yang disebabkan beberapa sebab: pembangunan sarana-sarana peribadatan yakni masjid yang makin massif, saling rebut ruang publik,

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dominasi birokrasi oleh elit Kristen, sektor ekonomi, hingga menguatnya identitas melalui unjuk simbol-simbol keagamaan. Sampai pada puncaknya muncul peraturan daerah pembinaan spiritual Manokwari sebagai Kota Injil. Secara kualitatif artikel ini mengurai, serta melakukan identifikasi secara etnografis bagaimana kontestasi Muslim dan Kristen, benturan antar keduanya, hingga perdebatan tentang soal Perda Injil. Sedikit dari kesimpulan artikel ini menemukan bahwa kelompok mayoritas merasa Papua secara historis merupakan pusat kekristenan dan upaya untuk merawatnya begitu kuat, hal ini seiring dengan dampak atas apa yang terjadi di luar Papua seperti banyaknya perda syariah yang marak diterapkan di daerah-daerah Jawa serta Sumatera.

Keywords: contestation; Christian and Muslim Community; Gospel City; Manokwari; Regional Regulation

Introduction

Papua has a variety of ethnic groups and languages. Each ethnic group has a different cultural system. Their meanings also vary about the surrounding nature. Ethnic groups that associate daily with mountains and forests have a different understanding of nature than ethnic groups that settle on the coast. It is this diversity that deserves attention. Knowledge of religion in Papua is little or much, will be the foundation in designing a future of peace in Papua (Afwan, 2015). Papua Province is one of the regions which has uniqueness in terms of governance. Besides the uniqueness, the population is distributed in various areas that have forest clusters, and the areas are separated by various terrains which are quite time consuming and tough. In terms of their religious adherents, the majority of Papuans are non-Muslim, have cultural diversity, carving skills and traditions of making *noken* (Podu et al., 2020).

However, Gerry van Klinken (2008) in his article ethnicity in Indonesia mentioned that since the days of Dutch colonialism, differences in ethnicity and religion have actually become a way of political power to create conflicts in Indonesia. We can trace it, among others, the Ambon conflict (Christians and Muslims), the 1950s Darul Islam uprising in Aceh which is ethnic in nature, in Poso (Central Sulawesi) post-1998 involving

religion. Clinger points out how political elites often construct ethnicity and religion to create crises. In Papua, especially West Papua, after the reform of the ethno-nationalist movement mixed with the politics of Christianity versus Islam became the trigger for the conflict.

In another context in Papua, Putnam's analysis (2007) confirmed other reasons for the diversity problem. Putnam concluded that ethnic diversity triggers the social isolation of each ethnic group and religion towards other groups. It has resulted in a reduction in one of the elements of social capital, namely trust, this problem, said Putnam, is influenced by the migration process that takes place without good social relations.

The encounter between Christianity and Islam in Papua, especially in Manokwari for a long time, has created various forms of relations that are peaceful and in conflict. The disharmony between the adherents of these two religions is very intense, coupled with the exclusivity movement which is quite worrying (al-Hamid, 2016). The socio-religious relations that take place and are formed are a marker of how the dynamics of relations between Christianity and Islam in Papua are taking place.

Papuan identity has, on several occasions, grown and developed along with the emergence of religious awareness so that each of them accentuated each other's identity, which became a marker of their existence. Religious symbols such as the cross (Christianity), crescent moon (Islam), and other symbols color the religious life in Manokwari. At the physical level, identity strengthening through the construction of places of worship shows that the two religious adherents compete with each other. In almost all corners inhabited by adherents of both religions, buildings for worship facilities stand side by side. The two religious groups seem to be competing to reach the top, so the impression of competition is evident. Various associations in the name of religion are very easy to find throughout Jayapura and are not infrequently used by the elite (Suprpto, 2012).

These emerging groups can be grouped into three parts: 1) indigenous/ethnic-oriented local identity groups; 2) Groups that are included in the

DAP customary institution (Papuan Customary Council); and 3) religiously oriented local identity groups, specifically for this third group, they fight for the supremacy of religion in society, there is the GKI (Indonesian Christian Church) denomination of the largest church in Papua with the Calvinist lineage representing Christians, and the Papuan Muslim Council, representing Islam (Saputra, 2017).

Papua's claim to be a blessed land ends in a local elite political claim that places Christians as the "beneficiaries". Meanwhile, the other party (Muslims) chose to strengthen themselves outside the bureaucracy. They choose another sector (the economy) as a medium to continue their work in Papua. Papua's claim of belonging to Christianity provokes a counter attitude, although it is not necessarily true. The elite eliminated the relationship between Christianity and Islam, but at the grassroots level, it was very messy. Latent conflicts are also maintained due to elite policies prioritizing the stratification/differentiation of certain groups. The immigrant group, which is predominantly Muslim, always faces local groups of people who are Christians. Even later, it is not found at the policy level, but at the practical social level, it is evident. Thus, the encounter between Christianity and Islam on the one hand provides a wide space for interaction for the two groups, but also raises various problems that often trigger conflicts between the two (Pamungkas, 2011).

The use of religion as a justification of interests provides space for creating segregation on a wide scale, especially for indigenous Papuans and migrants. Both groups continue to be in the shadows of mutual suspicion. History is an important factor that shapes the character of the Papuan people so that they continue to view others as different and suspect. Relations between Papua and the central government also play an important role in constructing relations still prone to conflict. Christian and Islamic groups' efforts to maintain the dominance of their respective influences are carried out by providing knowledge enrichment to the next generation. However, the change in their mindset tends to create new groupings that clearly distinguish themselves from the (local) community in general (Buchanan, 2011).

The contestation for public space, Islam as a minority, and Christianity as the majority in the political domain (bureaucracy/power), economy (traditional/modern, informal market), education, and health. Spaces such as mountains, fields, roads, government offices, and strategic places are not part of a particular religion, in Jayapura, since 1996 they have turned into religious-political spaces between Christians and Muslims who are fighting for influence and image there.

The presence of naming mountains, roads, and various religious attributes signifies that the battle for public space is so fierce that it creates a nuance of such deep conflict. There was a prayer contest in the recitation/tabligh and official state events. Minority communities often feel a lack of security in carrying out worship, like a case of throwing stones at the mosque when the call to prayer was disturbed by the call to prayer. Another case is the tension between the two religious groups due to a misunderstanding of a trivial issue (Ardiansah, 2018; Arsy, 2011).

The draft of the Local Regulation on the Gospel City that has been circulating, without knowing who distributed it directly, indicates that there are restrictions on freedom of religion, especially for Muslims. Even though the Local Regulation Plan for the Gospel City itself does not yet exist, it has received a very strong response because the contents of the circulating draft, if later made into a Local Regulation, are feared to contain discriminatory values. Moreover, the draft proposal has been widely circulated without knowing who disseminated it. Various kinds of responses and comments on the issue of Manokwari as a gospel city are based solely on assumptions not facts and this became a factor in the emergence of religious and political polarization both in those who agreed with the policy and the those who rejected (Klinken, 2008).

The controversy over the Gospel Local Regulation will be the focus of the study in this article; although this regulation has only arrived at the Local Regulation Plan, it has not been legally legalized, but there have been many actions from each elite who fought for or took action against it. Many mass actions and field attributes directly responded to this Local Regulation Plan. Based on this, it is felt that this topic deserves to be appointed as an exciting study material.

This article departs from mini-research using a sociological documentary approach, then the author observes and collects preliminary data from Papuan Islamic researchers and analyzes it qualitatively. Some of the initial studies that became the author's main reference were Cahyo Pamungkas' thesis entitled Papua Islam and Special Autonomy among Papuans which he wrote in 2008 at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia. Cahyo, in his thesis, describes the strategy of Papuan Muslims who are in a marginalized position and then seek to recognize their identity and cultural existence during the special autonomy period (Pamungkas, 2008). In addition, the other main reference, the author quotes and reanalyzes Binsar Hutabarat's findings regarding the Manokwari Local Regulation as Gospel City. Binsar describes the problems in Manokwari by telling the chronology of the emergence of the idea of Manokwari as the Gospel City. The difference with this article is that the author interprets data about Muslim voices and the facts of their existence. The author also presents how case by case, the rejection of Muslims in Manokwari impacts the dynamics of diverse life in Manokwari in particular and Papua in general (Hutabarat, 2017).

The Politicization of Religion in the Controversy Over the Construction of a Mosque

Rejection of the Great Mosque

In 2005, the Muslims of Manokwari took the initiative to build a representative mosque. The plan to build a mosque was supported by the candidate for Deputy Governor, Rahimin Kacong. He wanted to seek Muslim votes during the 2006 West Papua regional head election. establishment of the Islamic Center along with the construction of the Great Mosque (Hutabarat, 2017)

Discourse on the construction of the Grand Mosque received a strong response from the Papuan church leaders. The construction of the Great Mosque is contrary to the condition of Manokwari, which has long been known as the "Gospel City", even though its title has not been formalized.

It is feared that the Grand Mosque, larger than the churches that once existed in Manokwari, will damage the beauty of Manokwari as the Gospel City. Moreover, the effort turned out to involve local government officials. The Christian rejection of the construction of the Grand Mosque is also based on the fact that Muslims in Manokwari is not short of places to worship. On major holidays Muslims do use football fields as places of worship such as for celebrating Eid al-Fitr, but this custom is not because Muslim places of worship are not sufficient to accommodate Muslims to worship, but because on Eid al-Fitr. Muslims from various places usually worship together. However, on normal days this need does not exist, the mosques in Manokwari are sufficient to accommodate Muslim worshippers.

The location for the construction of the Grand Mosque is planned to be built on the small island of Mansinam, along with the secretariat of MUI, PUIM (Manokwari Muslim Association), PHBI (Committee for Islamic Holidays), BAZ (Amil Zakat Agency), LPTQ and YAPIS (Islamic Education Foundation). Juridically, the existence of the Grand Mosque in an area, especially a province, is a decision of the Minister of Religion No. 394/2003, regarding the Determination of the Status of Regional Mosques which include: the State Mosque (at the central level), the Grand Mosque (at the provincial level), the Great Mosque (at the district/city level), the Grand Mosque (at the sub-district level) and the Jami' Mosque (at village level). However, de jure, West Papua Province has no legal basis until now because Law no. 45/1999 was overturned by the Supreme Court in 2006.

The request for the construction of the Great Mosque was also rejected by the Regent of Manokwari (Drs. Dominggus Mandacan), dated October 19, 2005. The reason for the refusal was the refusal of figures and denominations of the Christian Church in Manokwari who were ready to express their attitude to maintain and develop the city of Manokwari as a historic city for the entry of the Gospel and the City of Civilization for the Papuans. Pastor I. S. Rumbiak on October 17, 2007, expressed the following attitude: 1) Refuse the construction of the Grand Mosque and Islamic Center, 2) Request the dissolution of the Grand Mosque and Islamic Center Construction Committee.

The Christian community responded to the plan to build a Grand Mosque by holding a large-scale demonstration in front of the West Papua Provincial DPRD building. They demanded that the construction of places of worship must take into account the existence of Manokwari as the City of the Gospel, 138 Local Regulations Manokwari As The Gospel City, and also the incident of the construction of the Grand Mosque which GOSPEL caused a feeling of being threatened by Christians that it should not be repeated. Based on suspicions that efforts to build the Great Mosque will continue to be pursued by all means, the demonstrators then demanded that Manokwari be formally designated as the Gospel City. The name of the Manokwari as Gospel City according to religious figures in Papua can be equated with the title "Jombang as the City of Santri", or "Aceh as Veranda of Mecca", but because of the determination of Manokwari as Gospel City related to efforts to stem the mission of Islam in Papua, the determination of Manokwari as the Gospel City has led to the feeling of being discriminated against by Papuan Muslims, and also by Muslims throughout Indonesia.

Responding to the demonstration, the Chairman of the DPR Irian Jaya Barat, Jimmy Idjie, promised to continue to approach until there was certainty so that all parties respected Manokwari as the Gospel City. During the demonstration, a spokesperson proposed to the Irian Jaya DPR and the Manokwari Regency DPRD that Manokwari as the Gospel City be made a Local Regulation, and dialogue between religious communities was carried out to build a common perception of the City of Injil Manokwari and Papua as a peace zone.

After the rejection of the Manokwari Grand Mosque into public discourse, the Papua Province MUI proposed to the MPR (Papuan People's Assembly) through Letter No. 62/MUI-PAPUA/XI/2005 dated November 30, 2005, which contains the following:

- 1) The city of Manokwari was made a particularly religious city because it was the initial place for the entry of the Gospel into Papua.

- 2) The capital city of West Irian Jaya Province was returned to Sorong.

In response to this problem, the MPR held a meeting with the team of the Manokwari Churches on November 28, 2005, in Jayapura. Concerning the letter, the Regent of Manokwari issued a letter that would form a Special Committee for the Grand Mosque in Manokwari. MPR member, Aroby Aituarouw said that he was appointed as Chair of the Special Committee for the Great Mosque of Manokwari. However, to respect the Muslims and Christians in Manokwari, the MPR did not provide any recommendations regarding the construction of the Great Mosque of Manokwari. Due to the preparations for the Pilkada at the end of 2005, the Manokwari Grand Mosque case finally disappeared.

Not long after the massive demonstration against the construction of the Great Mosque of Manokwari, the Manokwari District Regulation was issued as the Gospel City. It is unclear who drafted the Local Regulation Plan, but in reality, it exists and has become a discourse in Manokwari, Jayapura, and Jakarta. This rape does not cause problems because its nuance is to restore local culture in public life. However, some articles are considered to endanger inter-religious harmony as follows:

- a) Article 26 paragraph 1 states that in addition to stipulating the name of public facilities, the local government may stipulate the installation of religious accessories and symbols in public places and buildings or government offices or offices of business entities or legal offices/religious institutions.
- b) Article 37 states that everyone is prohibited from wearing clothes that highlight religious symbols in public places, places of education, and government offices.

This is evidenced by the following:

- a) Article 4 states that the Local Government has the authority to establish policies regarding the implementation of mental and spiritual development.

- b) Article 27: in the context of mental and spiritual development, apart from using Indonesian, the Local languages of Meyakh, Hatam, Sough, Mpur, or Numfor Dore are also used.
- c) Article 25 states that mental-spiritual development activities are carried out by taking into account the historical values, culture, customs, and local wisdom prevailing in the local community, especially the majority of indigenous Papuans or indigenous Papuans who adhere to Christianity.

Pastor Hoffni Simbiyak explained that the Local Regulation Plan on the City of Gospels resulted from a seminar on churches in Papua which stipulates the existence of 3 holy cities, namely Manokwari, Fak-Fak, and Merauke. According to him, the spirit of the Local Regulation Plan of the Gospel City should be seen, namely that Christians in Manokwari are treated like people in Aceh under Islamic law. Pastor Hoffni said Muslims should not carry religious symbols such as headscarves in public schools and government offices. According to Pastor Hoffni is not a problem that the majority of Christians discriminate against Islam but an effort to understand, recognize and respect the aspirations of Christians as native Papuans (Pamungkas, 2008).

Muslim groups argue that this is not only a challenge to the existence of Islam in Papua but also a threat to the unitary state of Indonesia. Worried about the Christianization of eastern Indonesia and the establishment of a Christian religion called the "Arafuru Ray", several jihadist groups began to prepare themselves to defend their religious beliefs in Manokwari (Ramstedt & Thufail, 2011).

Rejection of the Construction Andai Mosque

In 2015, a migrant businessman took the initiative to establish a mosque in South Manokwari District, the plan is that the mosque will be built on his own land. According to his statement, the development has received permits from various parties including the Mansim Tribe, the owner of customary rights to customary land.

However, this plan received a strong reaction from some Christian groups, because the building was considered too large. The mosque is feared to make the city of Manokwari a gospel city. Somewhat different from what the founder of the mosque revealed that he had received blessings and permits, Christian leaders actually mentioned that the construction did not get permission from the local government and because the mosque would be built on the Andai zending site which would threaten and disrupt the activities of the Christian community there.

Despite the rejection, the mosque was still built, finally because it felt unheard, there was a mass deployment of Christian groups to carry out demonstrations against the construction of the mosque, the demonstration was carried out in front of the office of the Regent of Manokwari, which was followed by all elements of the Christian community in Manokwari. This christian group is under the command of the pastors of the Indonesian Christian Church of Papua. First, their demands include asking the Regent not to issue a development permit. Second, ask the police to immediately call Haji Appe the initiator of the mosque's construction because he was deemed not to have heard the aspirations of local Christian leaders. The three demands of the mob demanded that the local government immediately certify Manokwari as a Gospel City.

But the problem is, the insistence of various parties to stop the construction of the mosque, even the Regent signed Decree No. 450/546 dated November 1, 2015 as a legal force to stop the construction, but the work on the establishment of the mosque is still ongoing.

As a result of this event, many took advantage politically, for example the Muslim population of Manokwari began to consolidate political forces pushing for one of the candidates for the Muslim Deputy Regent in the local elections which were then eventually elected.

These two cases of the issue of the establishment of mosques indicate that interfaith relations in Papua and Manokwari in particular are not going well, clashes and tensions are still very much felt. According to

research data from Muhammad Ali Saputra, there is an element of government impartiality in this regard to Muslims, as evidenced by for example the government's religious assistance flowing more to Christians and is not transparent.

Migration and Suspicion of Islamization

The existence of Muslims greatly influences political, social, and religious life in Papua. In political affairs, both at the provincial level and the district/city level are not balanced. Non-Papuan Muslims occupy the majority of positions or principal positions in the bureaucracy. In every district and city all are led by Muslims. In Jayapura, the deputy mayor is of Muslim origin, but his role is very limited and even limited (Rumbaru et al., 2018).

The astonishing growth of Muslims in Papua has given birth to Islamic hegemony which is manifested in the construction of mosques that are larger than Christian houses of worship. This threatens the existence of Papuan Christians, including the Indonesian Christian Church. Christians consider the establishment of the Grand Mosque as a form of intolerance for Papuan Muslims who marginalize Papuan Christians. Religious leaders in Papua are increasingly threatened when they find out that the facilities that have been given to Muslims so far are not the same as those experienced by Christians in other areas. Reports of the number of churches that were burned or damaged were also reported to the Christian community in Papua.

In Cahyo Pamungkas' findings, the community's responses varied. Attakiah, a Papuan female figure, said that the case of the rejection of the mosque in Manokwari was a form of urgency from the Church due to the presence of immigrants, most of whom were Muslims. This is marked by the increasing number of women using the hijab in public spaces. However, AT as a leader of South Sulawesi Family Harmony (KKSS), Papua refused to identify migrants with Islamization efforts, arguing that the immigrants did not come to spread religion but for an economic

mission, many migrants were also Christians, either from Batak or Manado (Pamungkas, 2008).

Indeed, migration has colored a number of changes and dynamics in many aspects of life in Papua. The purpose of migration here is the voluntary movement of the population from outside the Papua region with diverse purposes; military, staffing, or even religious duties. During the Dutch East Indies, the government took some administrative personnel from the Moluccas, Kei, and Manado, this was the beginning of religion becoming a fairly central issue, if previously in the western part of Papua the migration that occurred was directly proportional to the spread of Islam there, then the migration that occurred in Manokwari was the opposite. At this time Christianity spread very massively, where its development was not only in urban centers, but also up to the mountains. Admittedly, this migration only constituents on two things other than power, namely zending and education (Afwan, 2015)

Records in 1971 stated that the number of migrants reached 37,251 people out of the total population of Papua 923,440. most of the migrants settled in New Guinea. They mostly come from the Moluccas and South Sulawesi (Upton, 2009). In this period, the settlers were religious propagators, government employees, military, merchants, and transmigrants. A total of 31% is concentrated in Jayapura, 18% in Sorong, 12% in Merauke, and 11% in Manokwari.

The growth of migration rates in Papua is beginning to show its effects, especially the sharp differences between urban-rural, shifts in economic access opportunities, and competition in the economic sector. In addition, the phenomenon of migrants in Papua is always in line with the development of other things, including religion, especially Islam. The trend of the Islamic population is getting higher due to this migration process.

This increase in the number of Muslims is not surprising, because, before the arrival of Christianity in 1885 AD, in Papua, there were only two religions, namely: local/ancestral religion (especially in the interior) and Islam (especially in coastal areas). It was during the colonial era that

Christianization efforts took place with the support of the Dutch government at that time. At that time, there were 11,000 Papuan Muslim residents. Until today, the data from the Papuan statistical center has not stated the total number of Muslim Papuans, but for example in other areas, such as Merauke alone, there are 82,803 of the total 176,578 population that is Muslim. Even in Fak-Fak, it is dubbed the porch of Medina because it is the largest supplier of preachers and religious teachers in Papua. Thousands of ethnic Papuan Muslim communities are also spread to 14 regions in Jaya Wijaya Regency, a massive creed domino effect occurs in Papua (Mashad, 2020).

The phenomenon of converting to Islam from ethnic Papuans and the wave of Muslim immigrants brought suspicion and raised concerns among Papuan Christian leaders and communities, especially Manokwari, about Islamization.

Papuan Religion and Prejudice Against Others

Christianity cannot be considered to have contributed to the formation of a religious identity, so it cannot necessarily be said that the religion of the Papuan people is synonymous with Christianity. This misunderstanding eventually led to the assumption that Papua's religious diversity was a problem. The understanding that Papuans are Christians, while other religions are not Papuan is more because of Papua's long history. Over a long period of time, many Papuans have accepted Christianity into villages and the mountains are the main factor influencing papuans' view of religion, although there are actually many local religions as well. Many ethnic groups in Papua have their own rituals that are different from Christian rituals.

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The Papuan perspective built on Christian civilization is based on evangelical values by paying attention to the interaction between zendings and missionaries in the historical trajectory of the life of the tribes in Papua, which is difficult to ignore. At the same time, the success of Christians in instilling religious ideology as the basis of social and political movements and cultures is increasingly finding its form, as the era of openness and

special autonomy finds its way in Papua. Ottow and Geissler's first prayer at Mansinam Manokwari Beach and the stroke of I.S. Kijne's statement in Wondama Bay are authentic historical evidence of the foundations of Papuan civilization in the era of enlightenment, and continue to serve as a guide to the present day of the millennial era (Yamin et al., 2019).

In general, Papuan church leaders claim that Papua is synonymous with Christianity. This refers to the historical event that the gospel message first penetrated New Guinea (Uwe, 2012). This is used as the basis for mentioning that the land of Papua is a holy land, the land and Manokwari as the city of the gospel. Even though Christian teachings only developed in the 20th century AD, previously Catholicism was earlier, even Islam has been since the 16th century AD through the Sultanate of Tidore.

However, it is not entirely correct to state that Papuans are not synonymous with Christianity. There are so many ethnic groups in Papua that identify as Christians. Many research results show that one of them is Bensley (1994), the Dani Church of Irian Jaya and the Challenges its facing today. This book shows the anxiety of dani people facing the large number of Muslim immigrants. Dani people consider the presence of Muslim migrants to be alarming for the identity of Papuans who are Christian. That Papuans who are synonymous with Christianity will face Islamization and modernization at the same time. The implication of these two explanations is that Papuans are already aware of the presence of "others" who have different traditions, cultures, and religions. From here, in its long history, Papua shows diversity in terms of religion, that there are also other religions besides Christianity in Papua: Islam, Catholicism, Hinduism, and others.

Islam and Catholicism have not actually experienced rejection by Papuans. The rejection is more because of behavior that offends the value system of harmony in Papua. Religious behavior that has absolutely no respect for the customs and religions that have long been embraced by Papuans will be rejected. These two religions, including other religions

although the population is very small, can live and develop in Papua in the current context, the number of religions is not a problem in Papua. There are always other factors that accompany if religious issues are raised as a cause of conflict or violence.

Just to give an example from the explanation above is a murder case that occurred in the city of Sorong, West Papua, on April 21, 2014. The murder case of a Hajj began when the hajj was going to broadcast on air at RRI Sorong. At that time, in front of RRI was a drunkard. The drunkard asked the hajj for money. Probably because the hajj pack did not give, then the drunkard killed him. This murder case became big because it was peppered into a religious case. News spread that informs women not to go out of the house, at night wearing a headscarf. Clashes of hundreds of residents ensued. The atmosphere was tense from noon to late afternoon. Some areas were blockade of residents. By late afternoon and evening the atmosphere was restored after police and religious leaders counseled together and urged residents not to be provoked by provocations. Cases that originally had no religious factors later became a major conflict because they played religious issues

The above case example provides clarification that the issue of religion in the conflict in Papua is not the main issue. In other words, religious diversity in papua is not alarming. Religion is not a conflict factor. In Papua, religious diversity, as in some other places, is actually accepted and even becomes one of the drivers of progress in Papua. This can be seen in, for example, the composition of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) which always considers religious representation. Although Christians are the majority in papua, people of other religions are also not small in number. This condition of religious diversity has actually been seen for a long time, even before the Act of Law. In its history, besides having a variety of ethnic groups, in Papua there have also been religions such as Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam. This diversity is difficult to avoid and cannot be eliminated. In fact, this diversity greatly affects the living conditions of the Papuan people from the past until now, both in terms of social, economic, and cultural life.

Gospel Local Regulations and Diversity Problems in Manokwari

The Gospel Local Regulation was made to instill Christian values in local communities. For the nickname Gospel City to be assigned to Manokwari, it is not solely related to efforts to remind the public of the existence of Manokwari as the gateway for the entry of the Gospel into Papua, because some of them think that it is an effort to preserve the values of the Gospel which have been proven to have raised the honor of the community. Papua, the idea was later accepted by many people in Papua who are waiting for new hope to come out of their backwardness compared to other regions in Indonesia (Ramstedt & Thufail, 2011).

Here, it is clear that there is a relationship between the economic condition of Papua and the effort to formalize the title of the Gospel City, namely in the hope of catching up with the Papuan people. Papua's natural resource wealth is twice as much as the wealth of all the islands in Indonesia but unfortunately, they are far behind compared to other regions. On the other hand, Papuans admit that the modernization of Papua cannot be separated from the contribution of the inclusion of the Gospel in Papua and that Papua's backwardness is interpreted to occur because the community is not loyal to the Gospel value. Therefore, to achieve the glory of Papua, the Gospel is an important solution. Apart from that, there are other factors that this is a form of response to the burning of places of worship for Christians in various areas outside Papua and the talkative expression of the formation of a Sharia regulation that was enforced in the Aceh area are internal factors that are said to be the root of the proposed Gospel Local Regulation.

Until now, the Gospel Local Regulation is still the subject of a long debate, which does not seem to be over soon. This difference proves the importance of religion in local politics. The Gospel Local Regulations are made based on Christian values which prioritize Christianity over Islam, as can be seen from several parts of the article below:

- a) Item 14 General Provisions: The Gospel is good news.
- b) Article 25: Mental development pays attention to local culture that adheres to Christianity.
- c) Article 26: The government may install religious symbols in public places and offices.
- d) Article 30: Prohibit the construction of houses of worship of other religions if there is already a church.
- e) Article 37: Prohibit clothing that features religious symbols in public places (Ramstedt & Thufail, 2011).

However, the proposed formulation can reach its point of legality. There is one Local Regulation that is not related to the idea of the Local Regulation above but is still part of the Gospel Local Regulation. The Local Regulations are regulations prohibiting the importation, storage, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages. It states: "Considering that to actualize Manokwari as the area where the Gospel was introduced in Papua, and which is now dubbed the Gospel City and the City of Civilization for the Papuans, it is necessary to prohibit all activities of importing, storing, distributing and selling as well as producing alcoholic beverages in all jurisdictions of Manokwari Regency". The regulation states that the Local Regulation on Alcohol is the actualization of Manokwari as the Gospel City.

The Gospel Local Regulation is an attempt to strengthen local identity. However, the excessive attitude and also the deep-rooted sense of religious and tribal fanaticism still make the positive value of the efforts to turn the Gospel Local Regulation 180 degrees as an effort to discriminate. They are natives who want to maintain their livelihood and existence in their homeland not to make them entitled to give up the truest claim.

Papua claims to be the Gospel City, but it is presented as a peaceful and well-connected area with migrants escaping from all suspicions of Islamization, so perhaps conflict will be avoided. The main problem that underlies all conflicts that occur in Papua lies in the immigrants who take part there. Starting from the government's policy on Papua's development

efforts by opening up migration land but not maximizing the socialization of the policy, the Papuan people consider themselves to be "discarded" people. Then the emergence of social jealousy where immigrants who come to Papua have more potential in developing and controlling the economic sector. The growth, development, and progressiveness that is quite fast can be seen in the Muslims as their abilities increase in addition to developing the economy as well as showing their religious identity. seen from the growth of houses of worship and religious activities which are quite busy in Papua.

Maybe Muslim migrants in Papua don't want to highlight their religious identity or want to Islamize. It is proven and seen when immigrants choose the economic sector to survive in the land of Papua compared to choosing the spiritual sector. Because perhaps their longing for high religiosity is complemented by an adequate economy, they carry out religious development and defense.

Efforts like this are then interpreted by indigenous Papuans as the struggle for public physical space. Feelings of threat, insecurity, a different atmosphere, and economic domination are reasons that can be put forward when various symptoms of conflict appear. Claims of truth, claims of identity to Papua, and thwarting religious religiosity of worship are political praxis that is attempted as a form of mutual response in a pluralistic society. As is the case when Christians claim that the first religion to enter Papua was Christianity by celebrating that day, then emerged from Islamic groups who tried to explore the history of the entry of Islam into Papua with various kinds of evidence in other areas that show Islam has cultured. This is the form of mutual response and mutual social interaction that occurs in Papua.

The arrival of another element of community color that later entered into this conflict was the result of an invitation from the core actors of the conflict in Papuan society, namely the Christian and Muslim communities. Each of them invites the power of support from outside and then gives a new conflict spirit.

Conclusion

The birth of the Gospel Local Regulation versus the construction of the Grand Mosque is the culmination of political expression to fight for their respective identities. So when the Gospel Local Regulation appeared as a talkative expression of the Sharia Local Regulation in force in Aceh, it was indeed one of the reasons the Christian community wanted to legalize the Gospel Local Regulation. However, as has been explained in the discussion, there are other, stronger, and more logical reasons to rely on as the main consideration for the idea of the Local Regulation on the Gospel.

In its entirety and its entirety, the Gospel Local Regulation is not able to achieve the word legal and is stipulated as a Local Regulation. However, Christians are not out of their minds, a Local Regulation that they can legalize is the Law on the Prohibition of Importing, Storing, Circulating and Selling and Producing Alcoholic Beverages. In which there is a mention of the Manokwari City as the Gospel City as a basis for consideration. Called an achievement from the point of view, although it has not been able to legalize the whole idea of the Gospel City.[w]

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